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The Cold War was a tough time for some scientists. Most stayed in the no-man’s-land of 
political neutrality. Others bunkered down with the Left. A few went further and joined, 
openly, the Communist Party. This provided cold war warriors with abundant and usually 
lethal ammunition. This article examines the position of two Australian scientists whose 
professional lives were blighted or thwarted due to that explosive mixture of Cold War 
politics and Communist Party membership. 
The international literature on left-wing scientists during the Cold War is 
bountiful but the Australian literature is sparse and inadequate. There is no equivalent, 
for example, of Werskey’s pioneering work on British communist scientists (Hyman 
Levy, J.D. Bernal and J.B.S. Haldane)1, or Whitaker and Marcuse’s exhaustive study of 
Canadian scientists under surveillance.2 What we have, instead, are brief discussions of 
the political impact of Cold War pressures on Australian science in biographies,3 
organisational studies 4 and other works with unrelated themes.5 Indeed the most 
systematic analyses can be found in unpublished studies by Rasmussen and Moran.6 
Thus, the main objective of this article is to redress this oversight and, hopefully, 
illuminate some ways in which the politics of the Cold War impinged upon the lives of 
left-wing Australian scientists. In order to give sharper focus, the tale of only two 
scientists, Dr R.E.B. Makinson and Dr T.R. Kaiser, both of whom were members of the 
Communist Party, will be unravelled. There were, of course, a great many other 
Australian scientists, of whom the most notable was Marcus Oliphant,7 who believed 
their careers were diverted or derailed as a result of the Cold War atmosphere.8 Most 
were communist or left-leaning; some, as in Oliphant’s case, merely liberal. Usually, 
evidence of discrimination remains circumstantial, conjectural or anecdotal. Victimisers 
rarely wish to leave footprints. But what is different in the case of Makinson and Kaiser 
is the existence of archival documents that provide explicit evidence of the political 
intrusion of the Cold War.  
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It was a standard wartime procedure, namely intelligence assessments of all 
personnel engaged in secret scientific work, that inaugurated the thick security files on 
R.E.B. (‘Dick’) Makinson. Because of his expertise and training in the UK in the 1930s, 
it was proposed that Makinson, appointed to Assistant Lecturer in the Department of 
Physics at the University of Sydney in February 1939, be ‘fully utilised’ to conduct 
further research into the militarily-sensitive field of radio physics. The customary 
security report on Makinson was initiated. But accompanying this inquiry was a special 
high-level request: in a ‘Most Secret’ memorandum dated June 1941, the Director of 
Military Operations and Intelligence, Col. James Chapman, sought the following:  
It would be appreciated if you could arrange for very discreet enquiries to be made regarding this 
gentleman and for the result of such enquiries to be personally communicated to Dr. F.W.G. White … 
who is in charge of the work at present.9
It is highly probable that this request was due to an awareness, by the Australian and 
British security services between whom information exchanges occurred, that Makinson 
had already joined the Communist Party at Cambridge University in either 1936 or 1937 
and that in 1938 he had visited the Soviet Union.10 Suspicions, if they existed in 1941, 
were confirmed in 1946. At a meeting of the Australian Association of Scientific 
Workers (AASW), attended by a security officer, Makinson publicly acknowledged that 
he was a member of the Communist Party.11 The anxieties of security and intelligence 
authorities about the ideological leanings of scientists had recently been intensified by 
the arrest, confession and conviction of the British atomic scientist, Dr Allen Nunn May, 
on charges of espionage. The fact that the AASW meeting called for his release 
underscored those anxieties.12
On 20 September 1946, the Director of the Commonwealth Investigation Service 
(CIS) - the forerunner of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), 
established in March 1949 - sent the Commonwealth Solictor-General, K.H. Bailey, a 
report of the AASW meeting. This was followed up a week later by the following secret 
memo. It represented the first of a series of political interventions that vexed Makinson’s 
academic career.  
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I have now received advice from … a reliable and most secret source that there is a vacancy in the 
Chair of Nuclear Physics at Sydney University, for which an appointment is under consideration. 
Applications have closed and amongst the applicants is Dr Makinson… 
As chairmanship of Nuclear Physics will carry with it research into atomic energy, you may feel with 
me that that the matter of an appointment is of very great national significance and the fact that Dr 
Makinson is a professed Communist should be taken into account. 
It is not possible for us [ie.CIS] to make any move in the matter and I therefore report the matter to 
you in case you feel that it is advisable to consult with the Vice Chancellor and in the light of the 
report which was sent to your office on 20th instant.13
No appointment was made despite Makinson having the strong support of the incoming 
Head of Department, Professor V.A. Bailey, and at least one other member of the 
Selection Board.  
This correspondence assumes an even greater significance when it is remembered 
that the commencement of the Cold War, signalled by the ‘two-camp’ thesis promulgated 
at the inaugural conference of the Cominform in October 1947, was twelve months away. 
Moreover, a year earlier, World War 2 was still being fought - a war in which the Soviet 
Union, since mid-1941, was ‘our gallant ally’ and during which membership of the 
Australian Communist Party earned respectability, not admonishment.  
But now, in 1946, Australian scientists were expected to play a key role in top 
secret atomic research. Since the McMahon Act of July 1946, which terminated Anglo-
American wartime nuclear collaboration, 14  Britain’s post-war plans to experiment with 
atomic energy for military purposes intimately involved Australia. The two governments 
entered into a joint agreement under the authority of the Long Range Weapons Project 
for the testing of British missiles at the Woomera rocket range in the South Australian 
desert. This was a crucial element in the broader integration of Australia into Empire 
plans for the development of deterrent weapons.15 The Australian government was 
extremely eager to be involved with collaborative defence development where it involved 
atomic research and technology. Indicative of that eagerness was the vast financial 
expenditure on the LRWP, and this at a time of continuing postwar austerity.16 This 
commitment was not only, or even primarily, to ensure Australian ‘access to high 
technology weapons in future conflicts’.17 The government’s postwar vision of economic 
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reconstruction revolved around rapid industrial development, and the linchpin would be 
atomic power. In 1946, Marcus Oliphant’s sanguine view - ‘I believe Australia is 
now…on the verge of enormous development - and I believe that atomic power is 
coming in time to take part in this development’18 - received strong endorsement from 
Prime Minister Chifley.19 This, then, is the context for the CIS Director’s remark that an 
appointment to a senior academic position in nuclear physics, such as that sought by 
Makinson, was a matter of ‘very great national significance’. 
In 1948, the year CIS files recorded Makinson lecturing on ‘Science and War’ in 
the ‘Sunday Science Series’ at Marx School, Makinson applied, unsuccessfully, for the 
Chair of Physics at the University of Adelaide.20 In 1949, when he joined the ‘Release 
Sharkey Committee’ in May and formed the ‘Kaiser Protest Committee’ in September,21 
he again applied for the Chair of Physics at Sydney University and, again, it remained 
vacant. The following year, 1950, Makinson joined the NSW branch of the Australian 
Peace Council, lectured on ‘The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy’ at the Russian Social 
Club22, participated in a delegation to Canberra calling for the banning of the Atom 
Bomb, chaired a meeting of the Sydney University Labour Club protesting against 
political victimisation of scientists, and led a deputation to the American consulate in 
Sydney protesting against the gaoling of the ‘Hollywood Ten’.23 He applied, again 
unsuccessfully, for the position of Reader in Physics at Sydney University.24 His security 
report, dated 14 June 1950, was damning; it concluded: 
On his own admission, Doctor MAKINSON is a Communist. It is said of him that he is a “fanatical 
Communist” and from the foregoing summary this statement appears to be amply justified…He is 
undoubtedly a clever, dangerous Communist.25
For twelve months, from September 1950, Makinson took sabbatical leave to 
conduct research in England under Professor H.S.W. Massey at the University of 
London.26 Accompanied by his wife, then a Research Officer with the CSIRO, and young 
son, this overseas sojourn was ‘very fulfilling’27; it certainly would not have prepared 
him for the onslaught to follow. A few minutes past midnight on the final day of the 
parliamentary session, Friday 6 June 1952, the Liberal Party member for Mackellar, W.C. 
Wentworth, rose to speak in support of the Defence (Special Undertakings) Bill 1952. 
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Wentworth was a virulent and ardent anti-communist crusader. This is exemplified by the 
following sample of his initiatives. In 1946, he attended, and attempted to disrupt, the 
AASW meeting (discussed above) at which Makinson admitted his Communist Party 
membership.28 A few months prior to his election to Parliament in December 1949, he 
was involved in the notorious ‘Diver’ Dobson case in which communists were accused, 
wrongly, of attempted murder.29 In 1951, as part of his efforts to assist the work of ASIO, 
he became a ‘sleeping member’ of various organisations allegedly penetrated by the 
Communist Party.30. In 1952, he drafted a private member’s anti-communist Bill whose 
provisions disregarding civil liberties far outstripped those of the Communist Party 
Dissolution Bill of 1950.31 In 1954, he played a walk-on role in the high drama 
surrounding the defection of Evdokia Petrov.32  In London in 1955, he sought an 
audience with Sir Winston Churchill but was thwarted at the last minute by the 
Commonwealth Relations Office: ‘there is no need for the PM to see Mr 
Wentworth…[who] seems to be getting wilder and wilder in his ideas on thermo-nuclear 
war’.33 But in June 1952, it was Dick Makinson whom Wentworth had in his sights:  
I now refer to Dr Makinson…It is always difficult to mention names, because we do not like to face up 
to the fact that evil and treason have their human embodiments…I have no proof that Dr Makinson is 
still a Communist, but I have no doubt that he is…This man, who organized what was in effect 
treasonable conspiracy, remains a lecturer in physics at the University of Sydney…Dr Makinson went 
abroad only a few months ago, whether to get instructions or to give information, or simply for other 
purposes, I do not know…[but] I cannot believe, when we have scientists like Dr Makinson freely 
talking to eminent scientists who are quite loyal, that we shall be able to keep from Russia vital 
information that we wish to conceal…Dr Fuchs is a living monument of the success of the Communist 
treason policy…and I believe that Dr Makinson is an embryo Dr Fuchs.34
Later that morning, all the Sydney daily papers gave prominence to Wentworth’s attack. 
In the Cold War context of 1952, when a large body of opinion held a third World War to 
be both imminent and inevitable, when a great many conservatives believed that in the 
titanic fight against the spread of Communism, only ‘five minutes to midnight’ was left, 
and when frustrations with the stalemate in Korea were steadily mounting, banner 
headlines announcing ‘Lecturer Accused of “Communist Treason” by M.H.R.’ were 
alarming. According to his wife, Makinson personally took a written rebuttal to the 
offices of the Sydney Morning Herald, but nothing was published.35 Nor was a letter 
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from London, dated 29 July 1952, sent to the Herald in defence of Makinson by the 
Australian author, Dymphna Cusack, on behalf of the Australia-New Zealand Civil 
Liberties Society. It tackled the dilemma between political rights and scientific freedoms, 
a dilemma that the Kaiser case (as we shall see) had already deepened, not resolved. Her 
final remarks noted that the atmosphere created by W.C. Wentworth’s ‘fantastic charges’ 
were ‘hardly conducive to the development of scientific research in Australian  or to the 
strengthening of our democratic traditions of freedom of speech and freedom of 
opinion’.36 Another supporter was the historian and civil libertarian, Brian Fitzpatrick, 
who enquired ‘whether I can be of any use in your lately publicised appearance as one of 
the demented WCW’s victims…[for] these witch-hunters are apt to persist, and it could 
be that I might be of some help some time’.37
Where it was impossible for Fitzpatrick to help, of course, was with Makinson’s 
quest for professorial recognition. To argue that Makinson’s rapid rise through the 
academic ranks ‘was stopped because of the attacks on him by W.C. Wentworth’,38 
appears to overstate the influence of the ‘Mad Mullah of Mackellar’ (to use Fitzpatrick’s 
colourful phrase). For example, the proposal in 1952 that the Menzies government vet all 
appointments of scientists at ANU was initiated by the Director-General of ASIO, 
Colonel Charles Spry.39 Whatever the source, the fact remains that the criterion of 
political affiliation, not merit, forced Makinson to wait twenty years before he was 
promoted, by another university, to the position of Associate Professor. Even in 1953, 
when Sydney University established the generously-funded Institute of Nuclear 
Research, avenues for advancement within the Faculty were blocked. The barriers took 
two forms: the personal animosity, tinged with political distrust, of the new Director, 
Professor Harry Messel;40 and the intervention, once again, by the security service via 
two letters, stamped ‘secret’ from Colonel Spry.41  
Perhaps because it was now clear to Makinson that a professorial appoinment 
would prove elusive, he did not apply to the University of New England to fill its vacant 
Chair of Physics. But a younger Australian physicist, Thomas R. Kaiser, did. Along with 
two other applicants, he was shortlisted due to his outstanding academic record: a Master 
of Science with 1st class honours from the University of Melbourne (1946); a Doctorate 
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of Philosophy in nuclear physics from Oxford University (1949), where his supervisor 
was Lord Cherwell, one of Britain’s top atomic scientists; and thirteen publications on 
nuclear physics, meteor physics, radar physics and radar astronomy. His referees, who 
were of international standing, commented on his ‘great ability’ as a scientist and his 
‘very fine character’ as a person. The university’s Selection Committee believed Kaiser 
had ‘the most brilliant future of any candidate’, a prophecy confirmed forty years later by 
the awarding to Kaiser of the prestigious Gold Medal of the Royal Astronomical 
Society.42  
By the end of the selection process this highly regarded candidate on the shortlist 
had become the political casualty of a blacklist. The final remark of the Selection 
Committee was cryptic but lethal: ‘Doubtful whether suitable in view of past political 
activities’.43 This was one of approximately forty scientific positions in Australia and 
New Zealand that Kaiser applied for, without success, throughout the 1950s.44 Unlike 
Makinson, Kaiser was obliged to leave Australia permanently in order to find 
employment overseas which thereby deprived this country of a significant store of 
scientific expertise.  
But first, who was Thomas Kaiser and what were his ‘past political activities’? 
Born in Ivanhoe, Melbourne, to working class parents in 1924, Tom was a ‘battler’ but 
highly gifted.45 He won both Victorian and Commonwealth government scholarships to 
attend the University of Melbourne where he gained his Bachelor of Science and Master 
of Science (Honours, First Class) degrees in 1943 and 1946; by then his scholarly 
interests centred on radar and radiophysics.46 Kaiser’s rebellious tendency was evident 
early. In 1942 he was fined £1 for ‘indiscipline’ towards Professor Laby, the Head of 
Department of Natural Philosophy; this was one of the elements that contributed to 
Laby’s resignation in October 1942.47 In early 1944 he was appointed an Assistant 
Research Officer with the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), 
Division of Radiophysics, in the field of Radio Counter Measures.48 The secretary to the 
CSIR Executive was ‘particularly desirous’ of getting Kaiser since he was ‘the best 
student of his year’.49  
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The great potential displayed by Kaiser at the University of Melbourne was also 
evident in Sydney, to which he moved in August 1946 to take up an appointment at the 
CSIR’s Radiophyics Laboratory. In view of subsequent concerns that Kaiser posed a 
security risk, it is important to note that the relationship between radiophysics and missile 
research was close. In May 1946, the UK Department of Supply sent its Senior Military 
Advisor, Lieutenant-General J.F. Evetts, to Australia to select a testing site for long-
range rocket development. The connection between missile research, radar research, in 
which Kaiser was engaged during the war, and radiophysics, in which he was fast earning 
a reputation, is revealed in a Top Secret and highly significant memo to the Australian 
Dept of Defence:  
It is apparent that the question of use of C.S.I.R. facilities, in particular of the Radio Physics 
Laboratory, is a matter of great importance which requires consideration on the highest possible 
level. Applied radar research … is central to the development of guided projectiles, and, if, as a 
result of the report of the British mission headed by Lt.Gen. Evatts [sic], the United Kingdom and 
Australian governments decide that Australia should be used for the testing and development of 
these weapons, it appears certain that the facilities of the Radio Physics Laboratory will be 
required in addition to … qualified personnel.50
In this context opportunities, particularly for overseas training, seemed ready to open up 
for Kaiser. In the meantime, the accolades kept coming. One report commented that he 
‘has continued to demonstrate his exceptional ability and…is an outstanding young man. 
He is one of those who should be kept in mind for early experience overseas’.51 The 
acting chief of the Radiophysics Division was even more in his assessment: 
I have found Kaiser to have an excellent background of physics and of the fundamentals of radio 
techniques. He shows imagination and initiative together with an excellent command of both 
experimental and theoretical techniques.. I consider that he has a very good chance of developing 
into a first-rate research physicist, one well up to the standard of 1851 Exhibition scholars for 
example.52
It was therefore consistent that in November 1946 Kaiser should be awarded a 
highly-competitive and well-remunerated CSIR postgraduate research scholarship to 
study overseas in a chosen field. A place had to be found for him, so the Divisional Chief 
of the Radiophysics, E.G. Bowen, recommended Kaiser to Lord Cherwell, one of 
Britain’s leading physicists and director of the prestigious Clarendon laboratory in 
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Oxford.53 Once again, Kaiser received an unqualified recommendation: ‘I can commend 
[Kaiser] to you as a brilliant young man…I have little doubt that he will develop into a 
research physicist of first-rate ability’.54When it became clear, in June-1947, that the 
redoubtable Lord Cherwell would find a place for Kaiser, that he would give Kaiser 
‘senior standing in view of his M.Sc at Melbourne University’, and that he would act as 
supervisor of his D. Phil on nuclear physics,55a brilliant career in a burgeoning field 
seemed assured for this young working class lad. By July, Kaiser was sailing to England. 
It is perhaps only the retrospective wisdom afforded the historian that enables 
warning signals to be identified. To Kaiser, infected with more than a touch of idealism, 
even naiveté,56 such signs - even had he known of them - would have been ignored or 
dismissed. When Kaiser applied for a passport, on 12 May 1947, a copy was forwarded 
to the security service. The CIS Director recommended to the Department of Immigration 
that a passport not be issued.57 In this and other correspondence to the Attorney-
General’s Department, the connections between communism, espionage and atomic 
research were explicitly drawn. 
It has been reported that Kaiser was present at the Australian Association of Scientific Workers 
symposium on the [Woomera] rocket range…and there expressed himself as being against the 
project…Information received is to the effect that [Kaiser ] holds strong Communist views and is 
alleged to have stated some time ago that it was his intention to proceed to Canada to obtain 
employment in connection with Atomic Energy experiments… It is reported that he recently 
lectured to members of the [Communist] Party in connection with the Atom Bomb 
controversy…This further instance of Communist affiliation [sic] within the C.S.I.R. 
establishment (considering, also, the proceedings of the Canadian Royal Commission; and 
additionally the L.R.W.P.) is a matter of increasing security concern…The aforesaid information 
is brought to your notice in view of his Communist views and his expressed intention  of seeking 
work in the Atomic field.58
One does not have to read between too many lines to recognise the suspicion that 
Kaiser, if not an ‘embryo Fuchs’, was a potential May, a likely ‘fifth column overseas’59. 
Since the sensational defection of a Russian cipher clerk, Igor Gouzenko, in September 
1945, the spectre of Soviet spy rings hovered over atomic establishments. Due to 
Gouzenko’s revelations, the British nuclear physicist, Dr Alan Nunn May, who worked at 
the Anglo-Canadian atomic research facility near Ottawa (where Kaiser allegedly sought 
 9
employment), was arrested and convicted of espionage in 1946.60 Gouzenko’s testimony 
also triggered a chain of events, one of which was the establishment by the Canadian 
government of a Royal Commission whose report was widely read by security services in 
the West; 61 another was the decision by MI5 to place Klaus Fuchs under surveillance.62 
Nevertheless, Australian security’s assessment of Kaiser still fell well short of Vladimir 
Petrov’s cryptic but conspiratorial assessment of Kaiser’s movements: ‘Went on a 
mission to England’.63
Kaiser was saved by bureaucratic slowness: by the time the acting secretary of the 
Department of Immigration acted, on 1 August 1947,64 Kaiser had already left the 
country. But what remained on his security file, and this was retrieved two years later, 
were several pieces of ‘incriminating’ evidence: his membership of the CPA ‘front’ 
organisation, the AASW (with an inference that Dr R.E.B. Makinson ‘recruited’ him in 
1945); a clipping from the communist Tribune, dated 22 February 1946, reporting that 
Kaiser admitted to the Kingsford branch of the Labor Party, that he was in fact a member 
of the Communist Party; his attendance at an AASW conference on ‘Atomic Power and 
the International Co-operation of Scientists’ in April 1946; his participation in a ‘special 
meeting’ of the AASW in June 1946 to protest against the sentence imposed upon Alan 
Nunn May; and his contribution to an AASW symposium in April 1947 on the LRWP (at 
which Kaiser ‘revealed in conversation’ to the CIS informant - who was a scientist and a 
‘plant’ inside the AASW - that he ‘recently addressed Warragamba Dam employees on 
the rocket range and the atom bomb’). The final item was a copy of a small advertisement 
in Tribune advertising a farewell party for Tom Kaiser on 11 July 1947.65  
For the next two years at Oxford, from late August 1947 until mid-1949, Thomas 
Kaiser was immensely productive. In 1948, his sustained work on the 16 MeV betatron, a 
machine he helped build that produced high speed electrons, received public 
prominence,66 and an article on his experiments with the 15 MeV synchrotron was 
published in Nature, a leading scientific journal. In the first six months of 1949, he 
prepared a further two articles for publication; he delivered a paper to the annual 
convention of the Institute of Physics; and he submitted his doctoral thesis, completed in 
less than two years, on ‘Experiments on the acceleration of charged particles’, for 
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examination.67 Indeed, Kaiser was awaiting confirmation of his D.Phil when he made 
that fateful trip to London in late July. This trip would change, utterly and irrevocably, 
the direction of his life. 
At the height of the bitter 1949 general coal strike in Australia, a tiny group of 
young Australians living in London decided to demonstrate against the Chifley 
government’s strike-breaking actions.68 For five hours on a warm summer’s day, they 
handed out a thousand leaflets to passing Londoners. Placards reading ‘Eight T[rade] 
U[nion] leaders Gaoled! WHY?’ and ‘Dr Evatt: Democracy begins at Home’ were 
paraded, while the leaflet explained the ‘savage acts’ of the Australian Labor government 
in terms of imminent global conflict: 
 
Why this attack? Because Australia occupies an important place in the plans of groups in America 
and Britain who are planning a new world war. She is to be an arms and supply base for these 
groups. The workers are opposed to these war preparations….[and] the Government has decided 
to destroy the democratic organisations of the people.69
 
Notwithstanding the widely-held conviction that the Cold War in 1949 could soon turn 
hot and escalate into World War 111, such an insignificant demonstration would 
normally have been ignored by the mainstream press. It was small in scale, none of the 
six young demonstrators was well-known, there was no violence or obstruction, the 
police were not involved, and it was all over by five o’clock. The next day, 28 July 1949, 
only the Daily Worker, published by the Communist Party of Great Britain, carried a 
brief report accompanied by a photograph.70
 
That this incident would soon make not only front-page news, but lead to an 
official enquiry by the Australian High Commissioner, heated Parliamentary exchanges, 
agitation in the offices of the Defence Department and Prime Minister’s Department, and 
a flurry of top secret cables at the highest levels between London, Canberra and 
Washington, was due to the discovery by an MI5 informant that the identity of one of the 
Australians was Thomas Reeve Kaiser. In the words of the main organiser of the 
demonstration, ‘the ever-active T. K. came down in response to a telegram and he and I 
 11
were the stalwarts’.71 Although all those involved denied their communist connections 
and declined to identify themselves - the Cold War, after all, was getting very chilly in 
1949 - unfortunately for Kaiser, he was recognised by a female employee of Australia 
House whom he had befriended two years earlier during the voyage from Australia to 
England.72 She informed authorities and soon after Kaiser was interviewed by Scotland 
Yard. 
 
What followed, over the next six weeks, was a voluminous correspondence of 
memos, letters, cables and reports whose origins reflected the breadth of interest in the 
‘Kaiser case’: J.E. Cummins, the Chief Scientific Liaison officer in London; Dr Ian 
Clunies Ross, the chairman of the CSIRO; Norman Mighell, the Australian High 
Commissioner in London; the Australian Embassy in Washington; the United States 
embassies in London and Canberra; officials in the US Department of State; the 
Australian security services; Professor K.H. Bailey, the Commonwealth Solicitor-
General; the Prime Minister, J.B. Chifley; and the Minister for Defence, J.J. Dedman.73 
Indicative of the high-level concern within the scientific community was the visit of the 
former chairman of the CSIR, Sir David Rivett to the top secret Atomic Energy Research 
Establishment at Harwell, where he met with Lord Cherwell. His diary entry for 6 August 
reads: 
 
Lord Cherwell came out to greet me and in his room we discussed the Kaiser incident. Obviously 
C. has been upset by it and I offered him very full apologies…He said he knew some time ago of 
K’s leanings…C. was very kind about it all; not desirous of interfering with a man’s politics but 
recognised that the difficulty was due to communists acting in accordance with orders from 
elsewhere.74
 
Being the subject of such discussion and of such an avalanche of communication was 
immaterial to Kaiser:75 what mattered, for him, was that when it all stopped, he was 
without a job.  
 
The grounds for his dismissal from the CSIRO were legally shaky and morally 
spurious. When he refused to return immediately to Australia, as instructed, on the 
 12
grounds that he needed to ‘discharge [his] personal and scientific obligations’ and would 
return in October, the Executive of the CSIRO deemed his refusal a ‘breach of discipline’ 
and thereby a technical basis for dismissal.76 There was no question of his incompetence, 
of his breaching the terms of the travelling scholarship or even of his right to make public 
statements as a private individual about political issues unrelated to his employment. In 
fact, one gains the strong impression from reading the minutes of the CSIRO Executive 
meetings that it favoured not the sack but a reprimand.77 Indeed, the historian of the 
CSIR noted that although ‘the young scientist was guilty of an indiscretion…a strong 
reprimand should have been sufficient’.78 Even Sir David Rivett, who commented that 
‘[t]his man Kaiser is getting under my skin. I think he must be a very poor type indeed’, 
recognised that the CSIRO had no regulation forbidding employees from ‘displaying 
their political leanings’.79 It was therefore not surprising that one Executive member 
should comment in September that he was ‘still unclear on what precise grounds Mr 
Kaiser has been dismissed’. Certainly Kaiser himself, at least initially, expected 
exoneration: 
 
May I apologise for any embarrassment which the, to me, rather irresponsible Press reports have 
caused to you or to the Executive of the CSIRO…I will welcome the enquiry,80 as I am sure that I 
have been in no way guilty of “misconduct” as alleged in certain newspapers’….I know of no 
legal or moral bar to my holding political opinions and taking political action in support of those 
opinions…[and] I am sure that there can be no question of criticism of my work, both in Australia 
and at Oxford and of my loyalty as an officer of C.S.I.R.O.81
 
As Kaiser was soon to discover, such a mea culpa was futile, for there were far 
bigger issues at stake. Most historians who have discussed the ‘Kaiser affair’ have 
interpreted the ruthless treatment of Kaiser as a product of either the controversial 
restructuring of CSIR into CSIRO, the role of domestic pressures and considerations, or a 
case of political victimisation of left-wing intellectuals.82 I have argued elsewhere that 
the root cause of Kaiser’s dismissal lies outside Australia and relates to broader defence 
and security issues, especially complex problems concerning Anglo-American nuclear 
collaboration.83 Interpreting the extent to which external forces impinged upon domestic 
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decision-making is outside the scope of this article. What needs to be emphasised here is 
that Thomas Kaiser was a political casualty of the Cold War. 
 
For scientists within, and probably beyond, the CSIRO, the Kaiser case brought to 
a head the thorny issue of scientific secrecy and political freedom. Until 1949 - against 
the twin backdrop of steadily increasing attacks in the press and Parliament, and 
defensive counter-attacks by the CSIR especially during the latter part of 1948,84 - Sir 
David Rivett remained an ardent advocate of scientific freedom: 
As to all this business about classified information, security, secrecy and the rest of it I just loathe 
it. Of course we shall be prepared to give whatever guarantees may be required if that is the only 
way we can engage in research work of any value. I have however the utmost distrust of secrecy 
practices particularly when they are influenced by military people.85
Similarly, in a vitriolic letter in early 1949, he wrote: 
These politicians and Civil Service bureaucrats know nothing about scientific work or the 
conditions under which alone it can flourish. “Science” to them means atomic bombs and rocket 
ranges...Hence the freedom under which CSIR developed seems to them to be something 
demanding suppression.86
Just two weeks before Tom Kaiser crossed his Rubicon by journeying south from 
Oxford to London on 26 July, Rivett expressed the same sentiments about the importance 
of  freely-conducted scientific research ‘without barbed wire’ in an apparently inspiring 
presidential address to the British Society of Chemical Industry.87 This address was 
reprinted in the July issues of both Chemistry and Industry and the Journal of the 
Association of Officers of the CSIRO. Thus, Kaiser was very familiar with this address 
and, much to Rivett’s subsequent chagrin, cited it during the inquiry into Kaiser’s actions 
in August. 
 
After the Kaiser case erupted, discussion of the relationship between science, 
secrecy and freedom became decidedly muted. It is arguable that the turning point came 
when all CSIRO officers received a confidential one-page circular from the chairman of 
the CSIRO, Ian Clunies Ross. He expressed the ‘grave concern’ of his Executive about 
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the ‘recent happenings in London’. He then elaborated, in a manner previously 
unthinkable under Rivett, the extent to which increasing government control 
circumscribed organisational autonomy, defined the limits of political expression, and 
imposed an obligation upon officers of ‘decency and loyalty’ to the government which 
employed them. 
 
It is obvious that, if we are to continue to enjoy a large degree of freedom in the conduct of our 
scientific work in these disturbed times, we must avoid public involvement in controversial 
political issues: if we do not, we cannot blame anyone but ourselves if we suffer from political 
interference and the witch-hunting which has gone on in other countries…There may be a few 
amongst us who confuse scientific freedom with political licence, even to the extent of claiming 
the right to bring public discredit upon the Organization or the Government of which they are the 
servants. 
 
The circular concluded with a veiled threat: if such officers were tempted to engage in 
political controversy, ‘it is only right to let them know of the serious view the Executive 
must take…in the future’.88 The Executive, however, did not rest there; its next step was 
regulation. The minutes of the Executive meeting for 7 September 1949 record the 
insertion of a remarkable new edict: ‘No officer or employee shall engage publicly in 
political controversy, whether by speaking, broadcasting, writing letters to the Press, or 
by publishing or disseminating books, articles or leaflets.89 Exemplifying the prevalent 
atmosphere for left-wing scientists is this recollection: 
 
One could hardly forget that period. I was in the Physics Division in the National Standards Lab at 
the time, and I well remember attending a meeting which Clunies Ross addressed which had been 
called by the Officers’ Association. He attacked Kaiser at this meeting and implied that he caused 
his recent heart attack which I thought was unfair. Staff were very concerned at all the clamps that 
were going onto CSIRO, but only a few at the meeting expressed their disquiet clearly. I spoke 
very cautiously in favour of Kaiser along the grounds of freedom in science and I used Rivett’s 
speech about secrecy. But I felt very cowed. Those who spoke against his action [in sacking 
Kaiser] did so tentatively  because we were intimidated and Clunies Ross dismissed us all rather 
roughly.90
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The consequences of these events for Kaiser himself also reveal much about the 
limited manoeuvrability of left-wing scientists during the early Cold War years. In turn, 
they illustrate the incompatibility between scientific pursuits and political commitments. 
 
Kaiser continued to protest against his dismissal whilst in England in a series of 
letters to the Australian Scientific Research Liaison Office in London and the CSIRO 
Executive in Melbourne.91. His correspondence with Clunies Ross was typical: ‘I would 
like to receive from you a rational answer to the questions I have raised and a reasonable 
explanation of the actions of the CSIRO, rather than the arbitary and unreasonable orders 
and conditions outlined in the two cables.’92 Kaiser embarked for Australia, with his 
newly-married English wife,93 on 24 November 1949. He returned because ‘I didn’t 
accept my sacking. I went back to fight it’.94  
 
Despite or, perhaps, due to the fact that Kaiser had the full backing and resources 
of the AASW, the Australian Student Labor Federation - which devoted its entire second 
issue of Student Forward to the case95 - and the ‘Kaiser Protest Committees’ formed in 
both Sydney (by Richard Makinson) and Melbourne (by Jack Legge), Kaiser’s campaign 
for re-instatement was doomed.96 From his parent’s humble home in Waterdale Road 
Ivanhoe, he issued a stream of letters throughout January and February 1950. The final 
letter, seeking permission to attend a meeting of the CSIRO Executive in order to discuss 
in person the circumstances of his dismissal, received a peremptory reply: ‘After due 
consideration, the Executive decided that it cannot accede to your request’.97 There was 
no more correspondence. Kaiser was blacklisted. As the secretary of the CSIRO had 
earlier commented: ‘I should not imagine that the new [Menzies] Government will be 
well disposed to Dr. Kaiser’.98
 
Unable to secure any employment, Kaiser threw himself into political work on 
behalf of the Communist Party which itself was under threat from the Communist Party 
Dissolution Bill, 1950. He joined two CPA ‘front’ organisations - the Democratic Rights 
Council and the Australian Peace Council - and addressed a plethora of meetings: the 
annual congress of the National Union of Australian University Students, the Eureka 
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Youth League at its Warburton Camp in Victoria, the Kew ‘Tramways & Citizens Relief 
Committee’, a pit-top meeting of Wonthaggi coalminers, the Melbourne Trades Hall 
Council, factory gate meetings in Footscray and several small ‘cottage’ meetings in the 
homes of CPA members. In the last two weeks of March 1950, Kaiser travelled to NSW 
where he addressed over twenty meetings in Sydney, Lithgow and Newcastle. Typical 
was his ten-minute talk for Lithgow radio station on 21 March 1950. Entitled ‘Atomic 
Energy - for Peace or War?’, it touched on concerns that have been issues in this article: 
 
As a scientist, I am concerned at the witch hunting, the spy scare and the victimisation of 
progressive scientists…[which] are a means of intimidating scientists into agreeing to work on 
war projects. Security in science can only result in sterility in science. As Sir David Rivett has 
said: “secrecy and integrity in science cannot flourish together, and those who preach secrecy for 
security are false guides”. Science can only flourish in an atmosphere of free inquiry and free 
communication between scientists.99
 
After Kaiser returned to Melbourne, he was elevated to the National Executive of the 
Australian Peace Council (whose secretary, Ian Turner, had already campaigned on his 
behalf). In April he helped organise a major peace conference in the Exhibition Buildings 
attended by Rev. Dr. Hewlett Johnson, the ‘Red Dean’ of Canterbury. In May, he invited 
Britain’s most outspoken Marxist scientist, Professor J.D. Bernal, to fly to Australia, ‘all 
expenses paid’, to address a public rally on 10 June in the Melbourne Town Hall under 
the auspices of the Democratic Rights Council.100
 
By then, Kaiser had decided to return to England.101 A variety of activities was 
initiated by the Kaiser Protest Committee in Melbourne and the Kaiser Defence 
Committee in Sydney, including farewell dinners, socials, dances and meetings, to raise 
funds for the return voyage.102 With the banning of the CPA seemingly imminent, Kaiser 
was not a beneficiary of the Party’s ‘Fighting Fund’ and consequently the boat on which 
they returned, the s.s.Sorrento was ‘very poor indeed’.103 With the assistance of R.E.B. 
Makinson, Kaiser arranged to take up a position as assistant to Professor P.M.S. Blackett 
at Manchester University’s Jodrell Bank Experimental Station.104 The field of research, 
radio astronomy, was different from that in which he developed his expertise at the 
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Clarendon Laboratory. Kaiser differed also from Makinson in his grudging acceptance of 
the need to emigrate in search of work, something Makinson would never countenance. 
According to his wife, Makinson ‘refused to apply for any overseas position, even when 
it became clear that he would get no more promotion in Australia’.105. But the possibility 
of promotion denied is one thing; the prospect of enduring unemployment quite another. 
 
All this time, from the day Kaiser and wife disembarked at Fremantle on 20 
December 1949 until the moment his boat left Brisbane for Batavia on 30 July 1950, he 
was under constant surveillance by the security services. The following report, an extract 
from one day’s work in Sydney, is suggestive of the closeness of the scrutiny. 
 
13.  At 12.35pm KAISER and his wife came out of 40 Market Street. They proceeded on foot 
along York Street, down Town Hall railway station where they made a purchase at a 
bookstall, then came back into George Street, along Bathurst Street to Castlereagh Street, 
along Castlereagh Street to Market Street where they entered David Jones main store where 
they cought a lift. A search of all floors was made, but KAISER nor his wife could not be 
located.106 
 
On his arrival in England, the security services continued to trail Kaiser, though 
now it was MI5. Due to the unavailability of nearly all Special Branch and MI5 records, 
and the total closure of post-1945 MI5 records,107 the British security files on Kaiser will 
remain inaccessible for many years. The only declassified document is a memo, in the 
Office of the High Commissioner, notifying British security of Kaiser’s presence.108 
Kaiser should have known that the door never closes - for example, he was refused a visa 
when invited in 1972 to attend the launch of a ‘radio-clean’ satellite in the US which he 
himself had developed - but he remained ‘ignorantly idealistic…he just didn’t think that 
security would be active in this way’109. This was to prove his undoing and lead to his 
second dismissal. In 1952, the defence counsel for Julius Rosenberg, accused of passing 
atomic bomb secrets from Los Alamos to Soviet agents, contacted Kaiser to act as an 
‘expert technical witness’. Although the British Communist Party warned against it - ‘I 
didn’t know why’ - Kaiser forwarded a sworn affidavit to Washington. Unfortunately for 
Kaiser, a staff member at Jodrell Bank, who had been ‘planted’ by MI5 to keep tabs on 
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Kaiser, and others, learnt of this exchange (unwisely, Kaiser used Jodrell’s address) and 
the Director, Sir Bernard Lovell, was informed. Kaiser’s appointment was not 
renewed.110  
 
For two years, Kaiser was again unemployed. It was during this hiatus that he 
applied, inter alia, for the Chair of Physics at the University of New England, referred to 
earlier.111 In October 1955 he secured a one-year temporary replacement lectureship at 
Reading University; thereafter, his academic career took off.112 Indeed, when Richard 
Makinson visited him in 1972 - the last time they saw each other - he was 
‘flourishing’.113 But by then, neither would be troubled, nor their careers threatened, by 
letters such as the following. It was letters like this, and the sentiments underlying them, 
that helped so much to contaminate the working environment and emasculate the political 
freedom of so many Australian scientists during the early Cold War. 
 
After reading in the newspapers about the Communists at Woomera, and I believe the C.S.I.R.O. 
Department [sic] are employed there, I was wondering if it is of any news to you that Communism 
is rife in that Department. I was told by the wife of an officer that her husband was a Communist 
and that a Professor at the Waite Institute, who had been to Russia, was an ardent Communist and 
spread his propaganda among his pupils. I also had a C.S.I.R. officer boarding with me a few 
years ago, and he was studying the Russian language. If you are interested in the names of these 
people, I will inform you. Please treat this as Confidential.114  
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